We develop an identity choice model based on the stereotyping and signaling framework. Inequality of collective reputation between exogenous groups in equilibrium is due to feedback between group reputation and individual human capital investment activities (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993) . But it entails no positive selection into or out of the groups and human capital cost distributions among groups' members are equal. When group membership is endogenous and if the groups' reputations differ in equilibrium, the group with a higher reputation not only engages in more human capital investment activities, but the group itself also consists disproportionately of members with low human-capital-investment cost, who have more to gain from joining the favored group. This causes human capital cost distributions between groups to endogenously diverge, reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. We examine the existence and stability of stereotyping equilibria with endogenous group membership. We show that inequality deriving from stereotyping of endogenously constructed social groups is at least as great as the inequality that can emerge between exogenously given groups.
Introduction
We develop an identity choice model based on the stereotyping and signaling framework. If a worker's true productivity is not perfectly observable, employers have an incentive to use the collective reputation of the job applicants in the screening process. The individuals who belong to a group with a better collective reputation have a greater incentive to invest in skills, (and vice versa) . With their greater (smaller) skill investment rate, the group maintains a better (worse) collective reputation. Therefore, there are multiple self-confirming equilibria of collective reputation (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993) . In previous work related to such statistical discrimination, group identity is immutable and each group member is affected by the collective reputation of his own group only. We handle the dynamics between the collective reputation and the identity choice problem by relaxing the immutability assumption.
For instance, "Passing" is an apparent identity choice behavior. Talented young members in the group with the worse collective reputation may consider passing for the group with the better collective reputation when the return for passing, such as better treatment in the labor market, outweighs the cost of passing, such as the disconnection from their own ties. For example, a meaningful number of the black population consistently passes for White or some other race (Sweet, 2005) .
1
The Korean descendants in Japan, most of whom are descendants of forced laborers in mines and factories who were brought to Japan from the Korean peninsula during the period of Japanese imperialism, have passed for native Japanese, changing both surnames and given names around the time when they sought formal employment and marriage. This way they tried to escape negative stereotypes and prejudices.
2
When passing for a member of the advantaged group with high reputation is not possible due to immutability, the most talented of the stereotyped group are more likely to seek styles of self-presentation that aim to communicate "I'm not one of THEM; I'm one of YOU!" because they are the ones who gain most by separating themselves from the mass (Loury, 2002) . Taking the example of the Black population in the US, methods that are known to be used for "partial passing" are: affections of speech, dressing up rather than wearing casual clothes, spending more on conspicuous consumption, and migration to affluent residential areas. There is evidence that the more educated (or talented) blacks tend to speak standard American English rather than African American English (Grogger, 2008) . That is, the most talented of the stereotyped group "pass for" the slightly better-off subgroup that maintains a higher reputation than the stereotyped population as a whole by adopting the cultural traits of the subgroup.
This selective out-migration to the better-off subgroup may undermine solidarity in the disadvantaged population and cause conflict among them, such as the accusation of "Acting White" against the ones who practice the "partial passing" methods (Fryer and Torelli, 2010) .
1 The National Longitudinal Survey conducted by the Department of Labor of the US shows that 1.87 percent of those who had originally answered "Black" to the interviewer's race question in 1979 switched to either "White," "I don't know, " or "other," by 1998.
2 Every year about 10,000 Koreans living in Japan, out of around 600,000 Korean descendants holding Korean nationality, choose to be naturalized, giving up their names and original nationality (Fukuoka et al., 1998) .
However, there might be a social gain through this practice: at least some cultural subgroups of the stereotyped population might be able to recover their reputation when the talented young members gather around certain cultural traits. The usage of the observable cultural traits in the screening process can to some extent cure the social inefficiency caused by imperfect information about the true characteristics of workers.
The emergence of an elite social group out of a population can also be explained through identity choice behavior. The usage of a cultural instrument that is intrinsically irrelevant for productivity to form an elite group is well discussed in Fang (2001) as an explanation for the complexity of elite etiquette in European (or Confucian) societies and the respect for "Oxford Accent." Skilled and unskilled workers have different incentives to join a group with unique cultural traits that are expensive to obtain. Thus, the cultural group is treated preferentially by employers due to the higher fraction of skilled workers, even though the cultural traits of the group are not relevant for productivity. We may see an autonomously growing elite subgroup with differentiated cultural traits whose members are considered as distinguished from their peers.
The identity choice model in this paper starts with a standard statistical discrimination framework (Coate and Loury, 1993) . We identify multiple self-confirming prior beliefs, which we call Phenotypic Stereotyping Equilibria (PSE). Inequality of collective reputation between exogenous groups in equilibrium is due to feedback between group reputation and individual investment activities. But it entails no positive selection into or out of the groups. Therefore, human capital cost distributions among groups' members are equal.
However, when group membership is endogenous, and if the groups' reputations differ in equilibrium, the favored group not only faces great human capital investment incentives, but it also consists disproportionately of low human capital investment cost types, who gain more from joining a favored group, thereby causing human capital cost distributions between groups to endogenously diverge, reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. We call the multiple equilibria with positive selection non-trivial Affective Stereotyping Equilibria (ASE).
3
For the development of a theoretical model, we introduce two affects, A and B. The cost to choose affect A rather than B varies across the population. Agents choose affect A if and only if the anticipated return exceeds the agent's cost of choosing affect A. The cost distribution for the affects is irrelevant for the cost distribution of human capital investment or skill achievement. In equilibrium, we show that the more talented members, that is, lower human capital investment cost types, tend to choose affect A when the collective reputation of the affect A group is better than that of the affect B group.
We prove that inequality deriving from stereotyping of endogenously constructed social groups is at least as great as the inequality that can emerge between exogenously given groups.
While the inequality between exogenous groups involves no positive selection, low human capital cost types are disproportionately drawn to the favored group when groups are endogenous, causing the skill disparity between the groups to endogenously diverge.
We further prove that there always exist multiple non-trivial Affective Stereotyping Equilibria whenever multiple Phenotypic Stereotyping Equilibria can be constructed. Even more, in the overlapping generation framework, those non-trivial ASE are the only stable equilibria when the society has a critical fraction of newborns whose identity choice cost is sufficiently low. That is, the skill composition of the society converges to a non-trivial ASE in the long run. In addition, we show that non-trivial ASE can exist even under the unique PSE. Even when phenotypic discrimination cannot generate inequality between any identity groups, which could happen due to the uniqueness of the PSE, affective discrimination may bring about inequality between affective groups that are endogenously being constructed in a society.
4
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 summarizes the related literature on stereotypes, sorting and matching. Section 3 develops the model with the identify choice and skill investments. Section 4 defines Phenotypic and Affective Stereotyping Equilibria. Section 5 and Section 6 each identify Affective Stereotyping Equilibria with multiple PSE and with unique PSE. Section 7 presents further discussions and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature CDF of the affective behavior cost is denoted by H(k). We assume the affective symmetry:
Agents choose the affect A if and only if the anticipated return exceeds the agent's cost k. Otherwise, they choose the affect B. WLOG, it is natural to assume that PDF of the cost k, h(k), has one peak at k = 0: h (k) > 0 for any k ∈ (−∞, 0) and h (k) < 0 for any k ∈ (0, ∞).
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Workers' Skill Acquisition Behavior: Agents choose whether to be skilled or not: e ∈ {0, 1}. The cost to be skilled is c, which is non-negative. CDF of the skill acquisition cost is
WLOG, it is natural to assume that PDF of the cost c, g(c), has one peak atĉ: g (c) > 0 for any c ∈ (ĉ, 0) and g (c) < 0 for any c ∈ (ĉ, ∞).
An agent chooses (e = 1) if the return from doing so exceeds that agent's cost for the skill acquisition (c). We impose that c and k are independently distributed.
Employers' Wage-setting Behavior: Skill e is not fully identified. Employers observe group identity and noisy signal t ∈ R + distributed conditional on e. PDF of the signal conditional on e is f e (t) and its CDF is F e (t). Let us define the function f (π, t) as f (π, t) ≡ πf 1 (t) + (1 − π)f 0 (t), which indicates the distribution of signal t of agents belonging to a group of which the skill level is believed to be π. WLOG, we assume that f 1 (t)/f 0 (t) increases with respect to t, which is denoted by MLRP: Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Property. The employers' belief that an agent with signal t is skilled is ρ(π, t) (≡ P r[e = 1|π, t] 
. Under MLRP, ρ(π, t) increases with both π and t. The productivity of a skilled worker is w and that of an unskilled worker is zero. We assume that the wage is proportional to the expected skill level:
Workers' Payoffs:
The expected wage from acquiring skill level e is denoted by V e (π):
in which V e (π) is positive for any e ∈ {0, 1}. Workers' expected return acquiring human capital (R(π)) is defined as
R(π) is expressed as
The followings can be easily seen
Thus, R(π) is concave and R(0) = R(1) = 0, which implies that lim π→0 R (π) > 0 and
The first derivatives of V 0 (π) and V 1 (π) are
Note that V 0 (0) = w and V 1 (1) = w. Since we know R (0) > 0 and R (1) < 0, we have
It is more likely that V 0 (π) tends to increase as π increases and V 0 (π) tends to decrease as π increases. WLOG, we impose that relative marginal benefits (V 1 (π)/V 0 (π)) declines over π. Let us call the property the Marginal Benefits Ratio Property (MBRP):
for any δ > 0.
7
Thus, a worker with cost c, in a group believed to be investing at rate π has the payoff:
in which the function U (π, c) is increasing in π (∵ V e (π) > 0, ∀e ∈ {0, 1}) and non-increasing in c.
Equilibrium

Equilibrium with No Affective Stereotyping
Given the employers' prior belief (π) about human capital investment rate in a population, the fraction of workers who choose (e = 1) is G(R(π)). Let us denote an equilibrium be-
The set of all such equilibria is denoted by Ω CL (Coate and Loury 1993) . Let us call them Phenotypic Stereotyping Equilibria (PSE).
Absent affective discrimination, workers choose 'affect' based on their "natural" orienta-
This implies that the human capital cost distribution, namely G(c), is the same for both affective groups.
It is most likely that there exists either one or three equilibria in the economy, because Figure 1 . Multiple equilibriaπ ∈ Ω CL create possibility of Phenotypic Stereotyping (PS) wherein groups are exogenously and visibly distinct, though equally well endowed. Nevertheless, they fare unequally in the equilibrium.
The socially optimal level of human capital investment is G(w). However, human capital investment is socially inadequate in any PSEπ:
Consider a simple example that f 1 (t) = 1 − P 1 for any t ∈ (0, 1) and f 1 (t) = P 1 for any t ∈ (1, 2) together with f 0 (t) = 1 − P 0 for any t ∈ (0, 1) and f 1 (t) = P 0 for any t ∈ (1, 2). Define P r(e = 1|0 < t < 1, π) = W N (π) and P r(e = 1|1 < t < 2, π) = W P (π). It is easily seen that W N > 0 and
Using these results, we can confirm that the following MBRP property is true for this example:
Affective Stereotyping Equilibria
Let π i be employer belief about human capital investment rate in affective group i. Consider two affective groups A and B. Let us define a function ∆U (π A , π B ; c) as the payoff difference between a A-type worker and a B-type worker given their skill acquisition cost level 
The fraction of workers choosing (i = A) and (e = 1) is given by
Then, the fraction of agents choosing (i = B) is obtained using Σ
Consequently, the fraction of workers choosing (i = B) and (e = 1) is given by
Given the employer belief about human capital investment rates (π A , π B ), the actual investment rates for the affective groups denoted by φ(π A , π B ) and φ(π B , π A ) are
It is noteworthy that when employers' belief is the same for both affective groups(π A = π B ),
. This implies that the affective behavior does not affect the human capital investment activities:
An equilibrium with affective stereotyping (ASE) is defined as a pair of investment rates for
The set of all such equilibria is denoted by Ω F . Note that every PSE corresponds to trivial ASE where differences in affect are uninformative:
Affective stereotyping discrimination occurs if and only if π *
For notation simplicity, we use a and b instead of π A and π B . ∆U (a, b; c) can be expressed
Using R(a) and R(b), we have the following lemma concerning ∆U (a, b; c):
The above lemma is summarized in 
Proposition 1. When employers have different beliefs about two affective groups(π
the number of workers who adopt the 'affect' corresponding to the favored employers' belief is greater than that of workers who adopt the 'affect' with the less favored employers' belief:
That is, in the current setting with symmetric cost distribution, more than half workers adopt the 'affect' that corresponds to the more favorable employers' belief: Σ 
Lemma 2. Whenever R(a) > R(b), the following holds: φ(a, b) > φ(a, a) and φ(b, a) < φ(b, b). In a symmetric way, whenever R(a) < R(b), the following holds: φ(a, b) < φ(a, a)
and
The above lemma implies the following proposition. 
Proof. Let us prove the first part. First, consider an arbitrary level of b such that b < a <π.
For very small δ 1 and δ 2 , the following approximation holds: 
Let us impose that
Then, the incremental impact of decreased b on the overall human capital investment rate depends on the relative size of the skilled population of area P and that of area Q. As far as the skilled population of area P is greater than the skilled population of area Q, it is assured that the incremental decrease of b leads to the increase of φ(a, b): ∂φ(a, b)/∂b < 0 for any b < a <π.
Let the skilled population in area P and area Q be denoted by σ
Using the declining marginal benefits ratio property (MBRP),
for any 
Proof. Consider a very small δ > 0 such that a = b+δ. Define ∆(δ) as ∆(δ) ≡ R(b+δ)−R(b): 
(Note that the last terms,−.
The slope of the φ(a, b) curve given a=b can be expressed as follows:
We can achieve the following results:
Consequently, we have
The above lemma implies that the slope of φ(a, b) at the crossing point is positive (negative) whenever R (b) is positive (negative). Also, the slope of φ(a, b) at the crossing point is greater (smaller) than the slope of φ(a, a)(= g(R(b))R (b)) whenever R (b) is positive (negative).
Let us define a correspondence Γ(y):
Note that anyπ ∈ Ω CL satisfiesπ ∈ Γ(π) and anyπ ∈ Γ(π) satisfiesπ ∈ Ω CL . Thus, the set of PSE is represented as follows using the correspondence: Ω CL = {x : x ∈ Γ(x)}. The set of affective stereotyping equilibria can be expressed as Ω F = {(x, y) : x ∈ Γ(y) and y ∈ Γ(x)}.
Consider the case with multiple PSE. WLOG, we assume that there are three: π h , π m and π l . We will examine the case with a unique PSE in the next section. We can infer the following result using Lemma 3. 
Existence of Affective Stereotyping Equilibria
Lemma 6. The slope of correspondence curve at a trivial ASE (x,x), which is denoted by
Γ (x), is approximated by
Proof. Given the slope of φ(x, y) at (x,x) denoted by ∂φ(x,y) ∂x x=y=x and the slope of φ(x, x) at the same point, g(R(x))R (x), we can find a correspondence value x such that x = φ(x ,x+∆) using the following equation:
Therefore, we have Γ (π), which is approximately equal to
From Lemma 4 and G(R(x)) =x, we have
Then, we have the given result for Γ (x).
Using the above lemma, we can describe the correspondence curves more accurately. 
Given R (x) > 0 forx ∈ {π h , π l }, the slope of correspondence at a trivial ASE (x,x) depends on the the density of identity cost k around zero, H (0):
Lemma 6 derives the given result.
The lemma implies that given R (x) > 0, when the sensitivity of identity choice represented by H (0) is above a certain level,
, the absolute value of the slope of correspondence curve |Γ (x)| at the trivial ASE (x,x) is greater than one.
Theorem 1. Given multiple PSE, there always exist at least two non-trivial ASE.
Proof. First, consider the case withπ > π h . Γ(b) passes through the points (π h , π h ) and 
Proof. Given multiple PSE, using Lemma 3, we can find that Figure 3 . We can draw the shape of φ(a, Γ(π l ) h ), which pass through the φ(a, a) curve both at some a > π l and at some a < π l . This implies that Γ( The proposition implies that inequality between endogenous groups in some non-trivial ASE can be greater than inequality between exogenous groups in any PSE.
Stability of Affective Stereotyping Equilibria
Consider an intergenerational population structure. Every period, the randomly chosen α fraction of the workers die and the same number of agents are newly born. The newborn agents incur the cost c of skill achievement and the cost k to choose the affect A: k can be negative. Each newborn agent with his cost set (c, k) decides whether to invest for skills or not and which 'affect' to choose among A and B in the early days of his life. After those days of education and affect adaption, newborns join the labor market and receive wage set by employers. We assume that employers set the newborns' lifetime wage W (π, t) proportional to the estimated skill level ρ(π, t): W (π j , t) = w · ρ(π j , t) for the entering newborns with group identity j ∈ {A, B} and the noisy signal t, given ρ(π j , t) = π j f 1 (t)/f (π j , t). Employers use the skill composition of the current workers belonging to identity group j to estimate π j . Therefore, we have the following dynamics:
The direction arrows in Panel A of Figure 3 The theorem together with Proposition 4 implies that inequality between endogenous groups in non-trivial ASE should be greater than inequality between exogenous groups in any PSE in the long run, because stable non-trivial ASE must be "Persistent ASE."
Proposition 5. The middle trivial ASE (π m , π m ) is always unstable. Other trivial ASEs,
Using the direction arrows, we can easily confirm the above proposition as well. Therefore,
givenπ < π h , the trivial ASE (π h , π h ) is stable because of 0 < Γ (π h ) < 1 (Lemma 7). Using Lemma 7 and the above proposition, we have the following result.
The theorem implies the following interesting result: 
Therefore, when the society has enough fraction of newborns whose identity choice cost k is very low (i.e. H (0) is sufficiently big), balanced skill rates between two identity groups, (π h , π h ) or (π l , π l ), are not sustainable due to the incentives for the talented members to choose the "affect" associated with the slightly better collective reputation. The skill composition of the society converges to a non-trivial ASE in the long run, in which inequality between endogenous identity groups is greater than that of exogenous groups in any PSE: , ∀i, j ∈ {l, m, h}. Now imagine that the society is trapped by the low skill investment rates: the society is placed in a stable ASE (π l , π l ). As far as two identity groups are feasible and the identity choice is available for a fraction of workers, the social coordinator such as a government can mobilize the society to move out of the low investment trap by treating one of the identity groups favorably. The favorable treatment will lead more talented newborns to join the selected identity group. The skill level of the group can improve quickly with the higher skill investment activities of the newborns and by joining disproportionately more talented newborns to the group. However, the skill level of the other group which is not supported by the social coordinator may continue to be left behind in the low skill investment trap. 
Affective Stereotyping Equilibria with Unique PSE
In this section, we consider the case with unique PSE. Let us denote it by π u : G(R(π u )) = π u .
We show that non-trivial ASE can exist even under the unique PSE. It is surprising that even when phenotypic discrimination cannot generate the inequality between any groups, affective discrimination may bring about the inequality between affective groups forming endogenously in a society.
Existence of Affective Stereotyping Equilibria
Every PSE corresponds to trivial ASE: a trivial ASE (π u , π u ) exists which satisfies φ(π u , π u ) = 
At any non-trivial ASE, the collective reputation of an affective group is better than the PSE level π u and that of the other affective group is worse than the level π u .
Stability of Affective Stereotyping Equilibria
Using the direction arrows in phase diagrams in Figures 6 and 7 
(Lemma 7). Therefore, we achieve the following interesting result:
is stable if and only if H
, the only stable ASE are nontrivial ones while the trivial ASE (π u , π u ) is unstable.
Therefore, when the society has enough newborns whose 'affect' choice cost k is low, the equal society cannot be stable due to the emerging affective stereotyping. The society must converge to a non-trivial ASE, in which one group's skill level is greater than π u and another group's skill level is less than π u .
Discussions on Fang(2000)
The example of Fang (2000) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an identity choice model that can explain social activities such as passing and selective out-migration from a stereotyped group, loosening the assumption of group identity immutability in standard statistical discrimination models. More talented selves with a group that has a better collective reputation. The positive selection into a favored group plays a critical role in causing human capital cost distribution between groups to endogenously diverge. This model can be applied to many other social settings such as code switching (Goffman, 1959) and generating certificates to fight negative stereotypes.
In the given model, agents are myopic in the sense that they do not account for long-term expectations of groups' reputations. In Kim and Loury (2008), we discuss the stability of multiple equilibria in a dynamic setting. We identify the balanced dynamic paths to high and low stable reputation equilibria, and the 'overlap' range in which expectations about the future determine the final economic outcomes. The model in this paper can be extended to such a dynamic setting to generate further implications for identity choice behavior. 
